Mark C. Baker and Stewart Goetz, eds., THE SOUL HYPOTHESIS: INVESTIGATIONS INTO THE EXISTENCE OF THE SOUL by Evans, C. Stephen
Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian 
Philosophers 
Volume 29 Issue 2 Article 12 
4-1-2012 
Baker & Goetz, eds., THE SOUL HYPOTHESIS: INVESTIGATIONS 
INTO THE EXISTENCE OF THE SOUL 
C. Stephen Evans 
Follow this and additional works at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy 
Recommended Citation 
Evans, C. Stephen (2012) "Baker & Goetz, eds., THE SOUL HYPOTHESIS: INVESTIGATIONS INTO THE 
EXISTENCE OF THE SOUL," Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian Philosophers: Vol. 29 
: Iss. 2 , Article 12. 
Available at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy/vol29/iss2/12 
This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at ePLACE: preserving, learning, and 
creative exchange. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian 
Philosophers by an authorized editor of ePLACE: preserving, learning, and creative exchange. 
240 Faith and Philosophy
open-ended, even apophatic, discussions in the collection. A concluding 
remark by Stump is fitting here. “The appropriate conclusion to any argu-
ment for a methodology ought to be the employment of it” (263). I look 
forward to the work of analytic theology that is sure to be produced in the 
future. Whatever may constitute analytic theology, and how successful it 
can be, will be discovered only as the discipline is pursued.
The Soul Hypothesis: Investigations into the Existence of the Soul, ed. Mark 
C. Baker and Stewart Goetz. New York: Continuum Books, 2011. Pp. 287. 
$19.95 (paperback).
C. STEPHEN EVANS, Baylor University
The Soul Hypothesis contains a set of state-of-the-art papers in philosophy 
of mind defending substance dualism. Although the book is an edited col-
lection, unlike many such collections, it is tightly focused, and very well 
organized. The essays complement each other very well, and later essays 
refer to and build on points in earlier essays. Thus, in many ways the book 
contains something approaching a sustained argument.
It is not quite a sustained argument for a single view, however. Although 
all the authors are substance dualists of some kind, there are interesting 
differences in the kinds of dualism they defend. Indeed, one of the major 
theses of the book is that there are a range of positions that can usefully be 
described as substance dualism. One can usefully categorize dualisms by 
the degree to which they see the non-material soul as independent of the 
body and the degree to which they see the soul as differing from the body 
or other material objects. At one extreme, one might see Plato and (some-
what less extreme) Descartes, while at the other extreme one might place 
two of the authors in this volume: William Hasker, with his well-known 
“emergent dualism,” which holds that the mind is causally generated by 
the brain but nevertheless is a distinct entity, and Robin Collins, who holds 
a “dual-aspect” view of the soul, which attributes to it both physical and 
non-physical properties.
Along the way, various authors present many standard, well-recognized 
arguments for dualism (and critiques of materialism, which are often 
closely linked), such as the “unity of consciousness” argument and argu-
ments from the irreducibility of qualia. However, one of the interesting 
features of this book is that several of the authors believe that empirical 
and even scientific data are relevant to the arguments about dualism. They 
try to show that dualism, contrary to the dismissive charges of materialists, 
is not only fully compatible with recent scientific work, but actually may 
be given support by scientific considerations. Along the way suggestions 
are made as to how dualism could be tested, and how it could generate a 
scientific research program.
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Charles Taliaferro’s “The Soul of the Matter” kicks things off with an ex-
position and critique of “eliminative materialists” such as Paul Churchland, 
Stephen Stich, and Daniel Dennett (interpreted as holding to a view similar 
to Churchland’s). Taliaferro argues that our first-person consciousness is 
not simply a primitive theory, “folk-psychology,” destined to be replaced 
by a third-person scientific theory. The truth is that without first-person 
consciousness, no scientific theories can be developed or defended. (Many 
of the essays in the volume focus more on “reductive” and “non-reductive” 
forms of materialism; more attention to the kind of view Taliaferro criti-
cizes would have been a plus.)
Daniel Robinson’s “Minds, Brains, and Brains in Vats” continues this 
kind of philosophical argument. Robinson, who is an expert in brain sci-
ence, tries to show that recent brain research does not undermine dualism. 
To the contrary, the correlations between the brain and our mental life 
have to be established by taking seriously the claims we make about the 
latter. On Robinson’s view, much of the supposed empirical evidence for 
materialism is not really evidence against dualism at all, but is the conse-
quence of reading a materialist theory back into the evidence.
Mark Baker, whose own field is linguistics, looks at the issue of dualism 
in relation to language-learning and linguistic competence in “Brains and 
Souls; Grammar and Speaking.” Baker makes the argument that comput-
ers are not sensitive to meaning, but only to form—an argument similar 
to one that John Searle has made famous. Baker goes on to suggest that if 
the brain does function in ways similar to those of a computer, it may be 
subject to similar limitations. Thus, on his view a dualist view of the self 
may generate some interesting predictions as to what aspects of language 
involve only the brain, and what aspects involve the soul (or perhaps the 
soul and the brain).
Stewart Goetz’s “Making Things Happen: Souls in Action” tries to show 
that only a dualistic view makes sense of our status as rational agents with 
the power to make free choices. The main thrust of Goetz’s argument is 
directed against the view that a “principle of causal closure” makes causa-
tion by a non-physical soul impossible. Dualism is entirely consistent with 
neuroscience. However, Goetz, unlike some of the other authors (but per-
haps like Taliaferro), does not seem to think that any particular empirical 
considerations can establish the truth of dualism either.
Robin Collins, in “The Energy of the Soul,” provides a response to another 
standard anti-dualist argument, rooted in the claim that dualism would 
violate a well-established scientific principle, the principle of the “conserva-
tion of energy.” Collins argues that this objection presupposes an out-of-
date understanding of contemporary physics, since general relativity theory 
implies that the total energy in some systems cannot be defined. Also, if 
we look at contemporary quantum physics, it is not hard to see how there 
might be causal interaction that does not require any exchange of energy.
Hans Halverson, in “The Measure of All Things: Quantum Mechan-
ics and the Soul,” continues this look at the status of dualism in light of 
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contemporary physical theory. In a difficult essay (hard because the science 
is hard), Halverson explores some of the well-known paradoxes raised by 
quantum theory, including the “entanglement” of distinct particles and the 
“measurement problem,” which threatens to make observations impossi-
ble! Halverson explores various interpretations of quantum physics that 
might resolve these problems, and argues that a dualistic view actually 
might provide the best solution. Non-physical mental states cannot enter 
a state of “superposition” with physical states, but this entails that there is 
no “entanglement” and thus the “measurement problem” does not arise.
Dean Zimmerman, in “From Experience to Experiencer,” again tries to 
show that scientific considerations, far from threatening dualism, actually 
support dualism. He begins with an argument for property dualism, and 
then tries to show that the materialist who recognizes mental properties 
is stuck with extremely complex and implausible laws connecting these 
properties with the body. The main reason this is so is that such physi-
cal objects as brains and central nervous systems are necessarily vague. 
A dualistic view does not face the same problems since a non-physical 
mind can have a precise identity. Non-reductive materialists who accept 
emergent mental properties may thus be scientifically in a weaker posi-
tion than dualists.
William Hasker, in “Souls Beastly and Human” gives a very clear sum-
mary and defense of the “emergent dualism” he defends at greater length 
in his book The Emergent Self. Hasker begins with the discovery of a type 
of polyp in the eighteenth century that can regenerate itself when cut in 
half. Assuming the polyp has some kind of mental life (which is perhaps 
dubious), this means that cutting the polyp in half also produces a new 
soul. What Hasker really does is try to show that his kind of dualism does 
justice both to the way the mind depends on the brain and the uniqueness 
of the mind.
Robin Collins returns in “A Scientific Case for the Soul,” to develop and 
defend the view that the postulation of the soul could be justified through 
a scientific research program. Drawing on “superstring theory” Collins 
presents a “dual aspect” view of the soul as having both physical and 
non-physical properties. I found this essay intriguing, but I confess that 
much of it, like a great deal of this book, put great demands on my own 
understanding of contemporary physics.
In a revealing and illuminating “Afterword” the editors discuss the 
relation between dualism and theism. They argue that the two are logi-
cally distinct; it is possible to be a theist and a materialist about humans 
and also possible to be an atheist who is a dualist. They do acknowledge, 
however, that theism and dualism make congenial partners and illustrate 
how this might be so. The authors voice a suspicion that the contemporary 
aversion to dualism is rooted more in an aversion to religion than to good 
arguments or facts, and I share this suspicion. It is striking to compare the 
understanding and subtlety with which these authors explore both mate-
rialism and dualism with the caricatures of dualism and unsophisticated 
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arguments against dualism found in the writings of many materialists. 
Let’s hope that these essays provoke some genuine dialogue and respons-
es on the part of materialists.
I end with some mildly critical observations. The book is almost com-
pletely focused on contemporary issues and arguments. There is almost no 
attention paid to the history of thought about these issues. Even Descartes’s 
views are described in textbook fashion without much regard for historical 
complexity. There is no attention given to medieval treatments of the soul. 
This is not really a fair criticism; no book can do everything. However, I 
suspect that attention to the historical Descartes might reveal that Descartes 
was not, or not always, a “Cartesian.” In one key place Descartes argues 
that soul and body are separable, even if they are actually not separate and 
can only be separated by omnipotence.
I also would like to have seen some attention paid to the fundamental 
issue of what is required to treat two things as distinct entities. Views 
about such issues are assumed but not really discussed. I think it is not as 
clear as many assume what it means to say that I and my body are distinct 
entities. Most of the authors in this book seem to think of the soul as a pos-
tulated entity “in” the self. However, perhaps the soul just is the self, un-
derstood as a whole and not reducible to any physical object. I believe that 
Christians in particular need to think more about what it means to say that 
the self is embodied or incarnated. Perhaps it is true that I am essentially 
a soul, and that a soul is not a physical object. However, I may be the kind 
of soul whose nature it is to exist in a bodily form. If something like this is 
right, then it is misleading to think of the soul as a separate entity existing 
alongside the body. Rather I am a soul existing in a bodily manner.
The Believing Primate: Scientific, Philosophical, and Theological Reflections on 
the Origin of Religion, ed. Jeffrey Schloss and Michael Murray. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2009. Pp. 365. $59.95 (cloth).
E. J. LOWE, Durham University
This is an interesting and wide-ranging collection of new essays by psy-
chologists, social and biological scientists, philosophers and theologians 
on the currently much-debated issue of whether religious belief has an 
evolutionary origin and, if so, whether that calls into question its truth 
or rationality. Perhaps unsurprisingly, there is not a complete meeting of 
minds to be found in the volume, but at least the issue is discussed with-
out the heat and acerbity that characterizes the semi-popular works of 
some of the more prominent public figures with well-known views on the 
topic. Some of the scientific contributors to the collection do tend to write 
in terms that will strike the ears of many philosophers and theologians 
as being unduly simplistic and reductive. But then, no doubt, to the ears 
